Nov 22nd 2001
From The Economist Global Agenda
American politicians are arguing about what “phase two” of the war on terror should be
여러분들도 phase two가 뭔지는 아시겠죠. 테러와의 2차전쟁을 의미하는 것으로 다음 target을 의미하는 겁니다. 이라크가 되어야 할란지는 저도 모름....
“AFGHANISTAN is just the beginning of the war against terror,” George Bush declared to a roaring crowd of soldiers on November 21st. “There are other terrorists who threaten America and our friends, and there are other nations willing to sponsor them. We will not be secure as a nation until all of these threats are defeated. Across the world, and across the years, we will fight these evil ones, and we will win.” Mr Bush seemed determined to quash the idea that America would be content to declare victory in Afghanistan, or over al-Qaeda once Osama bin Laden is caught or killed, and then hope that things would return to normal.
상상해보세요. 부시대통령이 군인들 앞에서 연설을 하고 있습니다. 군인들은 와.... 하고 함성을 지르겠죠. 그 군인들을 우리가 표현하기에 a roaring crowd of soldiers라고 표현할 수 있는 거죠. 외워둘것.. 부시는 이런말을 하면서 확신에 가득찬듯 했다. 이 표현은
seemed determined to 라고 표현되어 있네요. 여기서 quash는 뭘까
quash1
v.t. <반란 등을> (완전히) 진압하다(suppress, subdue); <불안 등을> 가라앉히다.
ㆍ ∼ a revolt 반란을 진압하다.
quash2
－ v.t. <법률·고발·결정 등을> 무효로 하다, 취소[폐기, 각하]하다(annul).
ㆍ ∼ a former law 이전의 법률을 폐지하다.
ㆍ ∼ an election 선거를 무효로 하다.
ㆍ ∼ an indictment 고소(장)을 취하하다.
야후 영어사전에 나와있네요. 여기서는 1번일까 2번일까. 1번이죠... 아프간을 점령하면 미국이 이에 만족하여 더이상은 공격하지 않을거라는 그런 idea를 quash하는거죠..
뒷문장들이 그 idea를 잘 설명해주고 있네요...
But how will America translate this rhetoric into policy? After its victory in the Gulf war in 1991, the first Bush administration plunked down the political capital it won in the Muslim world on an effort to restart the Arab-Israeli peace process. It convened the Madrid conference that, ten years and many convolutions later, collapsed last year at Camp David.
최근에 상당히 자주 등장하는 단어 rhetoric 웅변술이라고 사전에 나와있죠. 반드시 기억할것. 그다음문장에 등장하는 plunk down..쿵 하고 내던지는 건데. 정확하게 번역할려고는 하지말고 1991년도 있었던 걸프전에서 지금 부시말고 그 아버지 부시가 이라크 바그다드를 plunk down했죠. 그렇게 상상하면서 이표현을 쓰세요. 여기서 눈여겨 볼거는
우리가 배운 노력의 일환으로라는 표현이 in an effort to인데 여기서는 on an effort to로 쓰여져 있네요.. 그 다음으로 convene은 단어 열심히 외우는 사람은 다 한번쯤은 봤을 단어라서.. 설명안함. 그리고 convolution은 둘둘 감긴상태 뱀이 둘둘 똬리를 틀때를 상상하세요. 그럼 여기서는 어떤의미로 이단어를 썼을까? 국제정세를 생각하고 평소에 여기에 관심을 가진다면 충분히 가능... 답은 여러분에게.. 아참 마지막 Camp David는 미국대통령 휴가때 가는 휴양지 입니다. 상당히 좋은 곳이라는데...... 나도 한번 가고싶다..... 암튼 오늘은 이마이 하고 다음에 또 하죠.. 밑에부분은 관심있는 사람있으면 해설부탁....
With victory at hand against the Taliban (though not quite yet, it seems, against al-Qaeda), the second Bush administration also finds itself with capital to spend in the region—capital that comes from the display of American military might and impressive political resolution. And Bush II seems, on the face of it, to be trying to repeat the history of Bush I.
On November 19th, Colin Powell, the secretary of state, committed America to restarting the peace process yet again. He appointed a new envoy to negotiate a ceasefire, Anthony Zinni, a former general (like Mr Powell). And he restated America’s backing for final-status talks on a Palestinian state.
Powell relaunches the peace process
So “phase two” of Mr Bush’s war is the Middle-Eastern peace process? Not if the so-called neo-conservatives have anything to do with it. “Phase two,” writes Tom Donnelly, in the Weekly Standard, “is a euphemism for Iraq. As the campaign in Afghanistan has progressed, a consensus has emerged that it is high time to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”
That may be a slight exaggeration. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence and the man who in the past has argued most forcibly for Saddam’s overthrow, has been cautious, arguing that “Saddam Hussein is one of [a number of leaders supporting terrorism] but not the only one.” At a conference in Geneva, John Bolton, the under-secretary of state for arms control, took the unusual step of naming Iraq for illegally building biological weapons—but he named five other countries, too.
This more guarded language is very similar to that used by some Democrats. For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman has argued that “[Saddam] has got the means—chemical, biological, working on nuclear—and the motive. He will do us terrible damage unless we do him out of power.”
The idea that Iraq is the logical phase two is usually associated with the Pentagon; and supposed to be anathema at the State Department. But that view may be wrong. On November 7th, Mr Powell said this: “Nations such as Iraq, which have tried to possess weapons of mass destruction, should not think that we will not be concerned about those activities and will not turn our attention to them.” The State Department has also been quietly forging closer political ties with exiled Iraqi military officers.
Encouraging the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians and attacking Iraq are not necessarily alternatives. Arguably, they could complement one another: Arab support for the peace process could mitigate the regimes’ likely (public) hostility to an attack on an Arab state. But the chances are surely that most Arab leaders would shun any American-led peace effort, at least while war was being waged. So the administration would have to assume that attacking Iraq would hamper efforts to find a settlement between Israel and Palestine.
Phase two incarnate
The real question, then, is should America try to overthrow Saddam Hussein? The political dynamic appears to be in favour. Politicians of all stripes support the idea. Almost all the pressure in America during the war on Afghanistan was for more force, not less. One poll, for example, found that nearly as many people thought the attacks on the Taliban were not strong enough (41%) as thought they were about right (47%). That suggests the public could be receptive to arguments in favour of a second front. And there is a political consensus that Saddam is not merely, in the words of Condoleezza Rice, “a bad actor”, but a possible threat to national security.
Yet those who have to think about how in practice to remove the beast from Baghdad are much more sceptical. Career diplomats might be thought congenitally incapable of planning a war against anyone. But both the CIA and the generals (including Mr Zinni, Mr Powell’s envoy) are also notably unenthusiastic desert warriors. The reason for this divide is that the two groups, politicians on the one hand, planners and diplomats on the other, have drawn different conclusions from the war in Afghanistan.
For the “remove Saddam” crowd, the lesson is that a repressive power, however strong it may look, will crumble under American bombing and popular resentment. American military backing transformed a rabble on horseback into an effective fighting force. And the lesson from the attacks on September 11th is also clear. If your sworn enemy can launch massive strikes against you, he will. As Richard Perle, the chairman of the Pentagon’s defence policy board, puts it, “I would hate to see us having this debate after another terrible attack on America.”
Wolfowitz, scourge of Saddam
The diplomats and planners, on the other hand, argue that the Iraqi opposition, especially the main organisation, the Iraqi National Congress, cannot be compared to the Northern Alliance. They have no military bases to operate from. They are not supported by any neighbouring power. And they are likely to be no more successful at gaining support from the dominant Sunnis than the Northern Alliance was in winning Pushtun support.
And the pragmatists also dispute the lesson from September 11th. Unlike Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein has a return address and can be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the planners and generals fear that an attack on Iraq would increase the chance that these weapons might be used—by Saddam himself or by al-Qaeda, if he gave them the arms as a last resort.
Mr Bush is the only person who can resolve this disagreement. For the moment he is rightly focused on the unfinished business in Afghanistan. The fact that no decision has yet been made may even explain why some people in the administration feel comfortable about making general warning noises to Saddam.
One possible next step might be to demand the immediate return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq, with far more intrusive powers, in return for a change in the sanctions regime. This would have the advantage of mollifying some of America’s European allies, notably Britain, which proposed this idea and which is opposed to attacking Iraq. But what if Saddam rejected the demand? Or accepted it and sought to hoodwink the inspectors? In so far as Mr Bush’s views can be discerned, they would appear to lean slightly towards trying to remove Saddam. This week Ms Rice, his national security adviser and weathervane of presidential opinion, said: “The world would clearly be better off, and the Iraqi people would be better off, if Saddam Hussein were not in power in Iraq. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that.” Indeed not. But there is plenty of doubt about how to do it, and what the risks are. And the time for deciding whether to run those risks cannot be far off.
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